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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
TONJA RYNHART, : Case No. 20020760-CA 
Defendant/Petitioner. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a interlocutory order denying suppression of evidence in a 
prosecution for possession of cocaine and paraphernalia. This Court has jurisdiction of 
the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the warrantless search of a purse found lying on the floor of a 
wrecked and unlocked minivan for evidence of the missing driver's identification 
was justified under the emergency aid doctrine? 
"[The appellate court] review[s] the factual findings underlying the trial court's 
denial of [a] defendant's motion to suppress under a clearly erroneous standard." State v. 
Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, f 8, 994 P.3d 1283. "[The appellate court] will determine 
there was clear error 'only if the factual findings made by the trial court are not 
adequately supported by the record.'" Id. (quoting State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1232 (Utah 1996)). "By contrast, [the appellate court] review[s] 'the trial court's 
conclusions of law based on such facts under a correctness standard, according no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions."' Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-32 (1998 & Supp. 2002): 
(1) (a) The operator of a vehicle that collides with or is involved in an 
accident with any vehicle or other property that is unattended and that 
results in damage to the other vehicle or property shall immediately stop 
and shall: 
(i) locate and notify the operator or owner of the vehicle or the 
owner of other property of the operator's name and address and the 
registration number of the vehicle causing the damage; or 
(ii) attach securely in a conspicuous place on the vehicle or other 
property a written notice giving the operator's name and address and the 
registration number of the vehicle causing the damage. 
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-116.10 (1998 & Supp. 2002): 
(1) As used in this section, "abandoned vehicle" means a vehicle that is left 
unattended: 
(a) on a highway for a period in excess of 48 hours; or 
(b) on any public or private property for a period in excess of seven 
days without express or implied consent of the owner or person in lawful 
possession or control of the property. 
(2) A person may not abandon a vehicle upon any highway. 
2 
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(3) A person may not abandon a vehicle upon any public or private property 
without the express or implied consent of the owner or person in lawful possession 
or control of the property. 
(4) A peace officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that a vehicle has 
been abandoned may remove the vehicle or cause it to be removed in 
accordance with Section 41-6-102.5. 
(5) If the motor number, manufacturer's number or identification mark of 
the abandoned vehicle has been defaced, altered or obliterated, the vehicle 
may not be released or sold until the original motor number, manufacturer's 
number of identification mark has been replaced, or until a new number 
assigned by the Motor Vehicle Division has been stamped on the vehicle. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine, enhanced to a second degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii), (4)(a) (1999 & Supp. 2002), 
and possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 58-37a-5 (1999). Following a preliminary hearing on 29 May 2002, defendant was 
bound over for trial (R15; R72:15). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized 
pursuant to a warrantless search of her purse after it was found inside a wrecked mini van 
on another's private property (R24-27). The same judge who conducted the preliminary 
hearing conducted the evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress (R72-73) 
(complete copies of the preliminary hearing and suppression hearing transcripts are 
attached in addendums A and B9 respectively). Because the judge was familiar with the 
evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing, which was essentially undisputed, the 
suppression hearing was abbreviated (see R73), add. B. The trial court denied the motion 
(R44-48) (a copy of the Memorandum Decision is attached in addendum Q. Defendant 
3 
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successfully petitioned the Court for interlocutory review (See Order, dated 5 November 
2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At about 8:30 a.m., on 6 January 2002, Officer Bumham of the Brigham City 
Police Department was on patrol when he received a dispatch report of an abandoned or 
wrecked vehicle (R72:2-3), add. A. Upon arriving at the scene of the wreck, Officer 
Bumham observed a minivan "out in the middle of a swamp" (R72:3), add, A. The 
minivan appeared to have "traveled over the curb, down an embankment," and "through 
two fences" before coming to rest "out in the marsh" (id.). Because it had snowed at 
approximately 3:00 a.m., and because the tire tracks were snow covered, Officer 
Burnham surmised the wreck occurred several hours earlier, sometime prior to 3:00 a.m. 
(R72:4), add. A. 
Officer Burnham opened an unlocked door in order to look for identification and 
to determine "if anybody was in the vehicle at all" (R72:4-5), add. A (see also R73:10), 
add. B. No one was inside the minivan, but he found a briefcase on the front passenger 
seat and a purse on the floor (id.). Officer Bumham looked through the purse and found a 
driver's license belonging to defendant (id.). The purse also contained $329 cash, "a 
couple of gift certificates to Smith's and a small bag that had a white powdery substance 
in it" (id.). Between the seats in the console area, Officer Bumham found a partially full 
bottle of vodka (id.). 
4 
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Following these discoveries, Officer Burnham tried unsuccessfully to reach 
defendant (R72:7-8), add. A. He also talked with the property owner, who indicated that 
he wanted the minivan removed so that he could repair his damaged property fences 
(R72:5-6), add. A\ (R73:10), add. B. Accordingly, Officer Burnham arranged for the 
minivan to be towed, which towing occurred at approximately 9:35 a.m. (R72:6), add. A\ 
(R73:13), add. B. While Officer Bumham did not perform a written inventory of all of 
the mini van's contents, he did "look through the entire vehicle for any valuables" 
(R72:8), add. A\ (R73:l 1-12), add. B. The only valuables that he retrieved, and 
consequently recorded, were the briefcase and the purse and its contents (R72:7), add. A\ 
R73:12-13), add. B. In total, Officer Burnham was at the scene of the wreck for one and 
one-half hours or until approximately 10:00 a.m. (R73:13), add. B. 
Later that afternoon, the towing company contacted Officer Bumham with 
information that defendant was trying to recover the wrecked minivan (R72:6), add. A. 
When Officer Bumham met with defendant at the wrecking yard he asked her about the 
baggie he had found and defendant "kind of laughed and said [she had forgotten] about 
that" (R72:7), add. A. Defendant said the baggie belonged to a friend and admitted that it 
contained cocaine (id.). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly found that an emergency existed here given the 
circumstances of the wreck, i.e., defendant's minivan jumped a curb in the middle of a 
snowy night and went through two property fences before coming to a stop in a marsh. 
5 
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Given the emergency, the trial court properly ruled that police could search a purse left in 
open view inside the wrecked minivan for the missing driver's (defendant's) 
identification under the emergency aid doctrine. A warrantless search of personal effects 
is justified under the emergency aid doctrine where, as here, persons are missing and 
feared to be injured or dead. 
Alternatively, the trial court's ruling may be affirmed on the ground that defendant 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the minivan or its contents after she wrecked 
it on another's property, failed to secure her valuables left within, and also failed to 
"immediately" notify the property owner of the damage or to leave her contact 
information "in a conspicuous place on the vehicle" as required by the motor vehicle 
code. 
ARGUMENT 
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A PURSE FOUND LYING ON 
THE FLOOR OF A WRECKED AND UNLOCKED MINIVAN FOR 
EVIDENCE OF THE MISSING DRIVER'S IDENTIFICATION WAS 
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE EMERGENCY AID DOCTRINE 
Defendant challenges the trial court's reliance on the emergency aid exception to 
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement to justify the warrantless search of her 
purse (R47-48), add. C. Officer Burnham searched defendant's purse for identification 
after finding it lying on the floor of a wrecked and unlocked minivan and the driver 
(defendant), whose whereabouts were unknown, was feared to be in some "distress and 
lost or disoriented" (R47), add. C. For reasons set forth below, defendant's challenge 
lacks merit. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A. The Fourth Amendment Standard: Reasonableness. 
"The touchstone of [an] analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the 
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular government invasion of a 
citizen's personal security.'" Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-109 (1977) 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,19 (1968)). "For 'what the Constitution forbids is not 
all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 
(quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (I960)). Thus, while "police must, 
whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through 
the warrant procedure," the emergency situation in this case is illustrative of a specific 
category of cases wherein courts have recognized that the exigencies confronting police 
render the warrant requirement impractical. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (emphasis added). See 
Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, fflf 10-13, 994 P.2d 1283. 
B. The Emergency Aid Doctrine Recognizes Law 
Enforcement's Dual Roles as Investigators and 
Community Caretakers. 
Indeed, the emergency aid doctrine recognizes that police necessarily interact with 
the public for a variety of purposes beyond law enforcement in their dual role as law 
enforcers and community caretakers: 
Communities have always looked to local police to perform social services 
unrelated or at best partially related to enforcing criminal law. 'Community 
caretaking' denotes a wide range of everyday police activities undertaken to 
aid those in danger of physical harm, to preserve property, or 'to create and 
maintain a feeling of security in the community.' It includes things like the 
mediation of noise disputes, the response to complaints about stray and 
injured animals, and the provision of assistance to the ill or injured. Police 
must frequently 'care for those who cannot care for themselves: the 
7 
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destitute, the inebriated, the addicted . . . and the very young.' They are 
often charged with taking lost property into their possession; they not 
infrequently see to the removal of abandoned property. In those places 
where social disorganization is at its highest, police are even called upon 'to 
serve as surrogate parent or other relative, and to fill in for social workers, 
housing inspectors, attorneys, physicians, and psychiatrists.' Community 
caretaking, then, is an essential part of the functioning of local police. It in 
fact occupies such a high proportion of police time that one can even 
question 'the value of viewing the police primarily as part of the criminal 
justice system.' 
Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. 
Chi. Legal F. 261, 271-272 (citations omitted). See Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, f 11 
(observing that emergency aid doctrine "'reflects a recognition that the police perform a 
community caretaking function which goes beyond fighting crime'" (quotation omitted)); \ 
Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1992) (recognizing that police are 
often called upon to interact with the public for reasons "unrelated to a penal or 
regulatory purpose" as when conducting a community caretaker automobile stop), aff'd 
875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994). See also State v. Mountford, 769 A.2d 639, 643 n.4 (Vt. 2000) 
(recognizing that emergency aid and community caretaker exceptions to warrant ( 
requirement, "both involve the police operating outside of a criminal law enforcement 
role").
 l 
Thus, the question in an emergency is not whether police acted upon probable 
cause to believe a crime has, or is being committed, but whether there is "evidence which 
would lead a prudent and reasonable official to see a need to act." Wayne v. United 
States, 318 F.2d 205,212 (D.C. Cir. 1963). "The need to protect or preserve life or avoid 
serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or < 
8 
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emergency." Wayne, 318 F.2d at 212. This determination is necessarily "pragmatic" and 
"contingent" on the reasonableness of the police action in light of an officer's "multiple" 
caretaking responsibilities. See Livingston, supra 261-263. 
The emergency aid doctrine accordingly supports "'a warrantless search of a 
person or personal effects when [a] person is found in an unconscious or semiconscious 
condition and the purpose of the search is to discover identification and other information 
that might enhance the prospect of administering appropriate medical assistance[.]" 
Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, f 10 (quoting Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Lawfulness of 
Search of Person or Personal Effects Under Medical Emergency Exception to Warrant 
Requirement, 11 A.L.R. 5th, § 2(a) (1993)) (plurality). As further recognized by the 
Davidson plurality, "[s]everal courts have also applied the emergency aid doctrine when," 
as here, "a person is missing and feared to be injured or dead." Id. at ^ 10 (citing People 
v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607 (1976)). See State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 549-550 (Utah 
App. 1997) (disagreeing with majority that police had probable cause to search, but 
recognizing that police did have a "reasonable basis" upon which to conduct warrantless 
search of defendant's apartment for missing child under the emergency aid doctrine 
(Greenwood, J., concurring in the result)). 
The criteria of the emergency aid doctrine, set forth in the Davidson plurality, 
includes the following: 
(1) Police have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency 
exists and believe there is an immediate need for their assistance for the 
protection of life. 
9 
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(2) The search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize 
evidence. 
(3) There is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the area 
or place to be searched. That is, there must be a connection with the area to 
be searched and the emergency. 
Id. at f 12 (adopting standard articulated in Yoder, 935 P.2d at 550 (Greenwood, J., 
concurring in result). 
C. Defendant Fails to Marshall the Evidence Supporting the 
Trial Court's Factual Finding That an Emergency Existed 
and His Challenge Should be Rejected on That Ground. 
The trial court evaluated these criteria and correctly determined that the emergency 
aid doctrine justified the warrantless search of defendant's purse, which she left in an 
unlocked minivan after wrecking it on another's property: 
[T]he community caretaker function of the officer was properly invoked 
here.1 The accident occurred around 3:00 a.m. on a cold January night. 
The absence of the driver made it imperative that the officer identify the 
driver so that he or she could be found. The officer acted appropriately in 
attempting to determine who was the driver. Although the [djefendant 
makes a good point that the owner of the vehicle could be ascertained by 
*The trial court's reference to Officer Burnham's "community caretaker function'' 
(R62) (emphasis) should not be confused with Utah's "community caretaker stop" 
doctrine. See Warden, 844 P.2d at 362. While the two concepts are related, the trial court 
is referencing the officer's community caretaking function or purpose with regard to non-
investigatory and general activities "undertaken to aid those in danger of physical harm, 
to preserve property, or 'to create and maintain a feeling of security in the community'" 
See Livingston, supra 271-272. The community caretaker stop doctrine, on the other 
hand, specifically concerns "police vehicle stops unrelated to a penal or regulatory 
purpose." Warden, 844 P.2d at 362 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the requirements of a 
community caretaker stop differ slightly from the more widely applicable emergency aid 
doctrine. See Warden, 844 P.2d at 364 (setting forth requirements for a community 
caretaker stop: (1) a seizure, (2) in pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker function, 
(3) under circumstances demonstrating "an imminent danger to life or limb[.]"). See also 
Mountford, 769 A.2d at 644-645 & n. 1. 
10 
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using the license plate number, the owner and the driver are not necessarily 
the same person, and the officer had a duty to ascertain the facts in order to 
preserve life in the event the driver had wandered off and was lost. As 
such, all three prongs of the [Davidson] test are satisfied[:] (1) [t]he officer 
had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency existed—a 
vehicle involved in an accident in the early morning hours that had been left 
by is driver[;] (2) [t]he officer testified that the search was for the purpose 
of ascertaining who was the driver so that the motivation was not primarily 
to arrest or seize evidence, and (3) it was reasonable to search the purse in 
connection with the emergency. 
(R46-47), add. C.2 
Because the determination of the emergency aid exception is "fact-intensive," 
Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, f 10, defendant is required to marshal the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings and then show, when viewing the evidence in the 
"light most favorable to the trial court's ruling," why the findings are erroneous. See 
State in re J. W,, 2001 UT App 208, f 9, 30 P.3d 1232. The marshaling requirement 
applies even when the evidence is undisputed—for an appellant must still argue all 
"supporting" evidence. Cf. id. 
Here, defendant has wholly failed to do so. Ignoring the evidence in support of the 
trial court's ruling, defendant baldly asserts that no emergency existed here under the first 
prong of the Davidson plurality's test. Aplt. Br. at 7-8. But defendant does not explain 
why the trial court's contrary finding, based on the undisputed evidence, is wrong. 
Rather, he simply and impermissibly "reargues the weight of that evidence." See J. W., 
2In so ruling, the trial court rejected the State's argument that defendant abandoned 
her minivan and her purse (R45-46), add. C. And even though the State did not rely on 
impoundment to justify the search, the trial court also found that the search was not 
justifiable as a formal impound/inventory search because Officer Bumham did not 
officially impound the minivan or complete a formal inventory (R45), add. C. 
11 
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2001 UT App 208, If 10. Defendant specifically complains that the "routine" accident 
occurred on a "major thoroughfare," "was visible from the roadway," Officer Burnham 
never searched the surrounding area for the missing driver, and there was no "blood, 
smashed windshield, body damage or other objective evidence that may lead one to 
believe that anyone was injured during the accident." Aplt. Br. at 7.3 Because defendant 
wholly fails to address the evidence supporting the trial court's finding of an emergency, 
e.g., that the minivan jumped a curb in the middle of a snowy night and went through two 
fences before stopping in a swamp or marsh, that the presumptive driver and/or 
passengers left behind a briefcase and purse in the unlocked minivan, and that the driver's 
and any passengers' whereabouts since the wreck were unknown {see R72:2-5), add. A, 
defendant's challenge may be summarily rejected. State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17 & 
n.2, 1 P.3d 1108. 
3Defendant asserts Officer Burnham never searched the surrounding area for the 
missing driver and/or passengers, but in fact no one asked the officer if he searched the 
surrounding area {see R72), add. A; (R73), add. B. Officer Burnham was at the accident 
scene for approximately one and one-half hours or from 8:30 a.m. until approximately 
10:00 a.m., with the minivan being towed away at approximately 9:35 a.m. {see R73:13), 
add. B. It is arguably reasonable to infer that the officer spent some of that time checking 
the surrounding area. 
12 
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D. The Trial Court Properly Evaluated the Facts of the 
Wreck to Determine That the Warrantless Search of 
Defendant's Purse was Justified as Emergency Aid. 
Alternatively, if the merits of defendant's challenge to the trial court's finding of 
an emergency are considered, the trial court's ruling is correct. Based on the undisputed 
facts of the wreck, i.e., defendant's minivan jumped a curb in the middle of a snowy night 
and ploughed through two fences before coming to a stop in a swamp or marsh this was 
no routine accident {see R72:2-5), add. A. Therefore, the trial court properly determined 
that Officer Bumham had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency 
existed and that there was an immediate need, for the protection of life, to search the 
wrecked and unlocked minivan for the missing driver's identification (R46-47), add, C. 
See Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, f 12 (plurality). The search of defendant's purse, found 
lying on the floor of the minivan, yielded in addition to her identification, however, a 
cocaine baggy.4 
The emerjgency circumstances noted above justified searching the minivan for the 
missing driver's identification as well as defendant's purse as the most likely repository 
of the driver's identification inside the minivan. Contrary to defendant's assertion, an 
emergency can exist even absent bloody evidence indicating that supposed and missing 
4Officer Burnham also discovered an open container inside the minivan (see 
R72:5), add. A. If Officer Burnham saw the open container prior to searching the purse, 
that fact would further support his belief that the driver may be in a condition requiring 
assistance and/or would provide independent grounds of probable cause plus exigent 
circumstances to justify the warrantless search. However, it is not clear in the record that 
the officer saw the open container prior to searching the minivan or defendant's purse, 
and therefore the State does not rely on the open container as an independent ground 
justifying the search here. 
13 
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victims are seriously injured. See Aplt. Br. at 7. Indeed, the fact that the supposed 
missing female driver in this case left her purse and its contents in open view for over six 
hours on the floor of an unlocked minivan wrecked on another's property is in itself 
alarming, whether or not it was spattered with blood. Mitchell, also involving a supposed 
victim whose whereabouts were unknown, is a seminal emergency aid case which 
illustrates the point. 347 N.E.2d 607. 
In Mitchell, a hotel chambermaid was reported missing after she failed to deliver 
clean linens to a guest as promised. Id. at 608. Coworkers found the chambermaid's 
street clothes and partially eaten lunch on the sixth floor of the hotel, where she was last 
seen. Id. Police assisted hotel management in a search for the missing chambermaid. Id. 
Vacant rooms were checked first, then occupied rooms. Id. Eventually, police knocked 
on Mitchell's sixth floor door and he denied seeing the chambermaid. Id. After a 
consensual, cursory glance around his room, the officer departed. Id. Later that 
afternoon, a homicide detective arrived to assist and another room-by-room search 
commenced. Id. The last room to be searched was Mitchell's sixth floor room. Id. The 
detective entered Mitchell's room with a management passkey and, "looking more 
carefully than his fellow officers had previously, noticed reddish brown stains on the 
bedding, rug and bathroom wall." Id. at 608-609. The chambermaid's body was found 
after the detective opened a closet door and saw two human feet sticking out from undei a 
laundry basket. Id. at 609. 
14 
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Addressing the first prong of the emergency aid doctrine, the Mitchell court upheld 
the detective's warrantless entry and search of Mitchell's room because there were 
"reasonable grounds" to believe an emergency existed—based on the chambermaid's 
unexplained absence and her failure to respond when summoned, and little else, i.e., her 
street clothes and half-eaten lunch. Id. at 610. Notably, the bloody evidence that 
eventually led to the discovery of the chambermaid's body was not found until after the 
warrantless entry of Mitchell's hotel room. Id. at 608-609. Notwithstanding the absence 
of evidence specifically indicating that the chambermaid had either "been struck with 
some illness, suffered an accident or possibly fallen victim to a crime," the Mitchell court 
concluded that "all of the circumstances led to the conclusion that some grave misfortune 
of an indeterminate nature had befallen the chambermaid." Id. at 610. See also Yoder, 
935 P.2d at 550 (finding "an emergency situation existed because of the missing child, 
discovery of her clothing, the cold temperature, and the amount of time that had passed 
since the child's disappearance") (Greenwood, J., concurring in the result). 
Here, the trial court properly found that Officer Burnham was similarly justified in 
believing that an emergency existed and required his immediate action for the protection 
of life, even absent a specific and bloody indication that the missing minivan driver was 
"in distress and lost or disoriented" (R47), add. C. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, ^  12 
(plurality); Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 610. As found the trial court, the wreck occurred in 
the wee hours of a cold and snowy January morning (R47), add. C. The wrecked minivan 
went over a "curb, down an embankment," and "through two fences" before finally 
15 
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coming to a stop "out in the marsh" (R72:3), add. A. When Officer Burnham was 
dispatched to the accident scene approximately six hours later, snow covered the tracks, 
the driver and/or passengers were gone, and a briefcase and purse were inexplicably left 
unsecured and in open view on the floor of the minivan (R72:4), add. A. Contrary to 
defendant's assertion, this was no "routine accident." Aplt. Br. at 7. 
Nor is the instant accident rendered a non-emergency by the fact the officer may 
not have searched the swampy area for the missing driver and/or passengers, as further 
asserted by defendant.5 Aplt. Br. at 7. While searching the marshy area surrounding the 
wreck may have also been reasonable, the officer's decision to identify the missing driver 
and to try and contact her by phone was also a reasonable course to purse (R72:4), add. C. 
Indeed, knowing the identity of the missing driver would seem key to an efficient and 
successful effort to locate the driver and/or any passengers. If the Officer had been able 
to contact the driver and ascertain his or her well-being, no further search would have 
been necessary. If not, he still may have been able to obtain information regarding the 
identities of the driver and any passengers, and whether the driver and/or passengers 
suffered from any medical conditions. As found by the trial court, the registered owner 
would not necessarily be the driver, thus attempting to identify the driver was the more 
reasonable and efficient course (see R47), add. C. Finally, if defendant had a left a note 
in a conspicuous place on the minivan identifying herself and explaining her absence, she 
arguably could have obviated the need to ascertain her identity. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 
5See n.3, supra. 
16 
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41-6-32(1) (1998 & Supp. 2002) (requiring a driver who damages another's unattended 
property to "immediately" "locate and notify . . . the owner of other property of the 
operator's name and address and the registration number of the vehicle causing the 
damage; or attach securely in a conspicuous place on the vehicle or other property a 
written notice giving the operator's name and address and the registration number of the 
vehicle causing the damage"). Officer Burnham reasonably and "diligently pursu[ed] a 
means of investigation which [was] likely to resolve the matter one way or another very 
soon[.]" Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703 n.14 (1981) (quotation omitted); 
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-687 (1985) ("The fact that the protection of 
the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by 'less intrusive' means does 
not by itself, render the search unreasonable") (quoting Cady v. Dombrowksi, 413 U.S. 
433, 447 (1973)). Accord United States v. Neff, 300 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(recognizing that courts "should not engage in 'unrealistic second-guessing' of a police 
officer's decision"). 
In sum, the trial court properly determined that Officer Burnham reasonably 
believed an emergency existed and that he needed, for the protection of life, to identify 
the missing driver and/or passengers sooner rather than later (R47), add, C. See Yoder, 
935 P.2d at 550 (Greenwood, J., concurring in the result). In searching the deserted 
minivan and the purse in open view for identification, Officer Burnham reasonably 
fulfilled society's expectation that police will act as community caretakers. See 
17 
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Livingston, supra 271-272. The trial court's ruling denying the suppression motion 
should therefore be affirmed. 
E. Alternatively, Defendant Had No Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy in Her Purse Left in Open View in an Unlocked Minivan 
For Several Hours After Wrecking the Minivan on Another's 
Property. \ 
While the trial court found that defendant had not abandoned her minivan for 
purposes of the abandoned vehicle statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-116.10 (1998 & 
Supp. 2002), the trial court did observe that the expectation of privacy in an abandoned 
vehicle "is greatly lessened," and that the "presumption of abandonment" in the statute 
(seven days) is not "coextensive" with the abandonment "for purposes of fourth { 
amendment analysis"6 (R45), add. C. Seet e.g., United States v. Barlow, 17 F.3d 85, 88 
(4th Cir.) (observing that for fourth amendment purposes the "accused need not have 
abandoned the search item in the strict property sense, where an intent to relinquish 
ownership must be shown; merely an intent to voluntarily to relinquish his privacy 
interest is sufficient."), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 850 (1994). In rejecting the State's 
abandonment theory here, the trial court observed that if the minivan were driveable it 
was more likely that it had been abandoned, but there was no evidence as to the minivan's
 { 
driveability (R46), add. C. In so focusing, the trial court arguably overlooked defendant's 
failure to take any action to secure the purse she left in the wrecked minivan, as well as 
i 
6The 2001 amendments to section 41-6-116.10, in effect at the time of the trial 
court's ruling, deleted the statutory presumption which is now a definition of 
abandonment. 
18 
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her concomitant statutory duty to identify herself to the owner of damaged property 
"immediately;1 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-32 (1998 & Supp. 2002). 
However, notwithstanding the trial court's rejection of the State's abandonment 
theory there is a related alternative ground upon which to affirm the ruling below: 
defendant could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the minivan or her purse on 
these facts. See Califoria v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988) ("An expectation of 
privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment protection . . . unless society is prepared 
to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable"). See also Wyoming v. Houghton, 
526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (recognizing that both drivers and passengers have a "reduced 
expectation of privacy with regard to property that they transport in cars, which . . . are 
exposed to traffic accidents that may render all their contents open to public scrutiny" 
(citations omitted)). Even though the minivan was not formally abandoned under section 
41-6-116.10, for Fourth Amendment purposes, defendant exposed her purse to public 
scrutiny and thus could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in it after she left it 
inside a wrecked and unsecured minivan on someone else's property. See Cormney v. 
Commonwealth, 943 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Ky. App. 1997) (holding that "any subjective 
expectation of privacy that [defendant] had in the wreckage necessarily yielded to the 
Commonwealth's legitimate public safety interests since the law enforcement officials 
responding to the accident were charged with the responsibility of determining all of the 
circumstances surrounding the fatality and the cause of the collision"). While the trial 
court did not expressly rely on this theory as a reason for denying the motion to suppress, 
19 
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or police that the driver was not so incapacitated as to be incapable of written 
communication and/or had left the scene to seek help. Having failed to do any of these 
things, however, defendant failed to exhibit even an subjective expectation of privacy in 
the minivan or its contents. Jackson, 937 P.2d at 549 n.3. 
Further, any expectation of privacy defendant may yet claim is not "one that 
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. In State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 
322 (Utah App.), cert denied, 982 P.2d 88 (1998), police videotaped Holden's drug 
related activity in his front yard from their vantage point across the street inside a 
neighbor's home. When Holden challenged the surreptitious videotaping, this Court held 
that he had "no subjective expectation of privacy in the activities in his front yard visible 
from his neighbor's window." Id. Nor was Holden's expectation of privacy in his front 
yard activities one that society was wiling to accept as reasonable. Id. at 322 n. 1. 
Here, defendant's expectation of privacy is even less. She left her purse and brief 
case in an unlocked minivan after wrecking it on another's property, leaving no note or 
other readily discernible identifying or contact information for the hapless property owner 
{see, e.g., R72:4-5), add. A. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling may be affirmed on the 
sound alternative ground that defendant demonstrated no subjective expectation of 
privacy in the contents of the wrecked minivan, nor would an expectation of privacy in 
the wrecked minivan or its contents be one that society would willingly accept as 
reasonable. Jackson, 937 P.2d at 549 n.3; Holden, 964 P.2d at 322. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the trial court's application of the emergency aid doctrine 
to uphold the warrantless search of defendant's minivan and purse. Alternatively, the 
trial court's ruling can be affirmed on the ground that defendant could have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the wrecked minivan or its contents. 
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THE CLERK: Case number 021-39. State of,Utah 
versus Tanja Rynhart. . 
THE COURT: Are counsel ready to proceed or do you 
need a moment? 
MR. RETALLICK: I'm ready, Your Honor. 
MR. BUNDERSON: Let me see if I can do it with just 
this officer, Your Honor. 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
MR. BUNDERSON: Let's try it with just Officer 
Burnham, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
MR. BUNDERSON: Call Bob Burnham to the stand. 
ROBERT BURNHAM, 
being first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BUNDERSON: 
Q. Your name is Robert Burnham and you're an officer with 
the Brigham City police department, is that correct? 
A. Yes. . 
Q. You're currently working patrol, do I understand that 
correctly? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you doing that on the 5th, 6th and 7th of January, 
that time frame, of this year? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. I'll call your attention to the matter before the court. 
3 At some time on or about January 6th, about 10 in the 
4 morning, did you have occasion to respond to what at first 
5 appeared to be an abandoned or wrecked vehicle in a field? 
6 I A. Yes. It was a little earlier than that, but, yes, I did, 
7 Q. Approximately what time? 
8 A. 8:30. 
9 1 Q. Did you get a call from someone or notice it yourself? 
10 A. Dispatch called me. Somebody had called them. 
11 Q. Where was it? 
12 A. On West Forest Street, about 1240 West. Straight north 
13 and west of the animal shelter. 
14 Q. Okay. What did you find when you got there? 
15 A. There was a van out in the middle of a swamp, a marsh 
16 area. It had gone through a couple of fences. It traveled 
17 over the curb, down an embankment, through two fences and 
18 came to rest out in the marsh. 
19 Q. On its wheels still? 
20 A. Yes, it was on its wheels. 
21 Q. Did you walk out to the van? 
22 A. I did. 
23 Q. Did the van have a license plate on it? 
24 A. Yes, it did. 
25 Q. Did you make an attempt to call in anything regarding the 
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1 plate before you went out to look at the van? 
2 A. Umm, I don't know if I could read the license plate or 
3 not. I don't remember from that distance. I walked out 
4 there and there wasn't anybody in it. We did try and call 
5 the owner. 
6 Q. I'm sorry. You called the owner? 
7 A. We did try and call the owner and there was no one who 
8 answered the phone. 
9 Q. Who was the registered owner, do you recall? 
10 A. I don't remember if there was more than one name on it, 
11 but Tanja Rynhart was one of them, if not the only registered 
12 owner. 
13 Q. All right. Did you have any evidence at that time as to 
14 when the vehicle had left the road? 
15 A. There was snow on the ground. It had snowed as recently 
16 as 3:00 that morning. It appeared that it had happened just 
17 prior to 3:00 because of the snow on the ground. 
18 Q. There were no tracks in the snow or they were covered 
19 with snow? 
20 A. Let me look. (Pause.) It was prior to 3:00, yes, 
21 because the tire tracks had been covered off the side of r-he 
22 road by the snow. 
23 Q. And this is about 8:30, approximately? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. When you got to the van there was no one in it. What did 
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1 you then do? 
2 A. I opened the vehicle up, got in it, to see if I couid 
3 find some identification. Try to find out the identity of 
4 the owner, the driver, and if anybody was in the vehicle at 
5 all. 
6 Q. Now, was this before or after you had made attempts to 
7 contact the owner? 
8 A. It was before. 
9 1 Q. Okay. What did you find in the vehicle? 
10 A. I found a valise or a briefcase on the front passenger 
11 seat; and a purse, a woman's purse, on the floor of the front 
12 passenger side. 
13 Q. What did you do then? 
14 A. I looked through both of them and found a driver's 
15 license, identification, to Ms. Rynhart. Inside the purse 
16 also was $329 in cash, a couple of gift certificates to 
17 Smith's and a small bag that had a white powdery substance in 
18 1 it. Also, in the console area between the two seats of the 
19 van, was a partially -- an opened and partially full bottle 
2 0 of vodka. 
21 Q. Okay. This white baggie, this baggie with a white 
22 substance in it, turned out to be cocaine, is that correct? 
23 A. That's what the defendant told me later, yes. 
24 Q. Where was that in relation to the wallet and the purse, 
25 can you tell me that? Were they separate, do you recall? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page c 
1 A. As I recall, the baggie was -- I can't remember. I 
2 didn ft make a note in my report. 
3 Q. Do you recall if you had to open any other kind of 
4 container? After opening the purse and during the process of 
5 locating and retrieving the wallet from the purse, do you 
6 recall if the bag of white substance was visible while you 
7 were doing that or was it inside another container of some 
8 sort? 
9 I A. As I recall, it was in with the wallet and I don't recall 
10 opening anything else to get to it. 
11 Q. Did you eventually talk with Ms. Rynhart that day? 
12 A. Yes, I did. 
13 Q. Is this her seated next to counsel here? 
14 A. Yes, it is. 
15 Q. Where did you find her? 
16 A. I was in the process of -- during the morning I had a 
17 wrecker come and take the vehicle out of the field. Just 
18 prior to two p.m. that same day I received a call from the 
19 wrecker company that she was down there trying to recover her 
2 0 vehicle. 
21 Q. Was there an impound done of the vehicle? 
22 A. We just towed it for safe keeping, to get it up out of 
23 the field, and so the field owner, the property owner, could 
24 get their fences repaired. 
25 Q. Under the Brigham City police policy, under those 
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1 circumstances, could you have conducted an inventory? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Did you retain the purse and the briefcase? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Did you go to the wrecking yard? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Okay. And you talked with the defendant there? 
8 A. I did. 
9 Q. Did you ask her about the bag of white substance? 
10 A. I did. 
11 Q. What did she tell you? 
12 A. She told me that -- she kind of laughed and said I forgot 
13 about that. She said it belonged to a friend of hers. She 
14 also told me that it was cocaine. 
15 Q. Okay. Do you know if Officer DeRyke pursued the matter 
.16 any further? 
17 A. Officer DeRyke was involved at the time with the Box 
18 Elder County strike force, narcotic strike force. That 
19 information was passed along to him. I'm under the 
20 impression that he met with Ms. Rynhart on at least one 
21 occasion after that. I don1t know to what end. 
22 Q. At what point did you make your first call to the -- in 
23 an attempt to locate Ms. Rynhart or the other owner, if there 
2 4 was another owner? 
25 A. Well, it would have been sometime after 8:30. I tried tc 
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1 call her several times personally from my office after I'd 
2 cleared from the scene. 
3 Q. In context, though, of the events occurring, would that 
4 call have been your first call or your request of dispatch to 
5 make the first call, have been made before or after you 
6 retrieved the purse and the briefcase? 
7 I A. It would have been after. 
8 MR. BUNDERSON: Okay. That's all I have. Thank 
9 you. 
10 THE COURT: Cross-examine. 
11 MR. RETALLICK: Thank you, Your Honor. 
12 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
13 BY MR. RETALLICK: 
14 Q. Officer Burnham, are you familiar with the abandoned 
15 vehicle statute in the state of Utah? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Okay. How long does a vehicle have to sit when itfs on 
18 public or private property before it's considered abandoned? 
19 A. Private property is seven days. 
20 Q. Okay. And the vehicle hadn't sat there for seven days, 
21 is that correct? 
22 A. That's correct. 
23 Q. There was no attempt to do an impound inventory as 
24 required by Brigham City police department policy? 
25 A. I didn't do a written inventory, no. 
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1 Q. Okay. Did you have a handheld microphone, you know, 
2 radio communication device with you when you approached the 
3 vehicle? 
4 A. A walkie-talkie? 
5 Q. Yes. 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. And so when you got there you could see the license plate 
8 and could have radioed the plate in and found out who the 
9 owner was, is that correct? 
10 I A. That is a possibility. I don't know if I did at that 
11 I point or not, but I could have, yes. 
12 Q. Well, you indicated in your testimony that you opened up 
13 the vehicle before trying to make contact with the owner, is 
14 that correct? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Did you open up the vehicle and begin your search of the 
17 vehicle before or after you radioed the license plate in to 
18 find out who the owner was? 
19 A. I don't remember. 
20 Q. Okay. 
21 MR. BUNDERSON: I'm sorry. What was the question, 
22 counsel? 
23 MR. RETALLICK: I asked him if he began his search 
24 of the vehicle before or after he radioed in the license 
25 plate to try and find out who the owner of the vehicle was. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page v; 
1 Q. (BY MR. RETALLICK) You didn't need to go through the 
2 briefcase or the purse in order to determine whether there 
3 was anybody hurt or injured inside the vehicle, is that 
4 J correct? 
5 A. That's correct. 
6 Q. All right. And in your police report you indicate that 
7 you searched the purse and that's where -- it was inside the 
8 purse is where you located the suspected item of cocaine, is 
9 I that correct? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Did you NIK test this? 
12 I A. I did not. Officer DeRyke did. 
13 Q. All right. Do you have a lab result indicating that it 
14 was cocaine? 
15 A. I do not. 
16 Q. Okay. In your police report you don't say that she said 
17 that it was cocaine, but you said you asked her about the 
18 J cocaine and she smiled and said it belonged to a friend of 
19 hers? 
20 A. That's correct. 
21 Q. Didn't she also indicate that she does not use drugs? 
22 A. That's what she told me, yes. 
23 Q. And so she was basically telling you what someone else 
24 I had told her, is that correct? 
25 I A. (No response.) 
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1 Q. Relating to you what it was -- her knowledge of what it 
2 was was based on what someone else told her, is that correct? 
3 A. That was my assumption. 
4 Q. All right. Did the owner of the property request that 
5 you have this vehicle towed from their property? 
6 A. He asked me when it would be taken away. 
7 Q. And you didn't -- you obviously have knowledge of the 
8 statute and you didn't inform him that under the statute it 
9 basically has to sit there for seven days before you can 
10 authorize its impounding, is that correct? 
11 A. No, we didn't discuss that. 
12 Q. All right. 
13 1 MR. BUNDERSON: By the way, we don't agree that 
14 that's exactly what the statute says, Your Honor. 
15 MR. RETALLICK: If you want, Your Honor, I'll 
16 present the statute to the court. You can take judicial 
17 I notice of what the statute says. 
18 THE COURT: What is the reference? 
19 MR. BUNDERSON: 41-6-116.10 and IB. An abandoned 
20 vehicle is a vehicle left unattended on public or private 
21 property for a period in excess of seven days without express 
22 or implied consent of the owner or person in lawful 
23 possession or control of the property. 
24 Q. (BY MR. RETALLICK) Have you seen any lab results, gotten 
25 a copy of any lab results? 
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A. The only involvement I've had with that case was just 
that morning. I've not seen any reports. 
MR. RETALLICK: Thank you. Nothing further, Your 
Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 

















Q. Have you, by report of Officer DeRyke, another police 
officer, been informed that the NIK test showed positive for 
cocaine? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You mentioned that this was near or the vehicle had 
bypassed an animal shelter that is a city owned animal 
shelter? 
A. It was across the street. 
Q. That's a building? 
A. Yes. ' 
Q. Was it within a thousand feet of that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And we charged a paraphernalia charge. I'm sorry, I 
didn't hear any mention of any paraphernalia. Did you find 
anything? 
A. There was a mirror with some powder on it that was also 
in the vehicle. 
Q. Do you recall where that was? 
A. It was in the purse. 
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1 Q. The same purse? 
2 A. In the same purse as the identification. 
3 MR. BUNDERSON: Thank you. That's all I have. 
4 THE COURT: Anything further? 
5 MR. RETALLICK: No/ Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: You may step down. Does the state rest? 
7 MR. BUNDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Anything from the defense? 
9 MR. RETALLICK: Move to dismiss, Your Honor. 
10 There's absolutely not one shred of evidence that the items 
11 found, or the item found, was in fact a controlled substance. 
12 MR. BUNDERSON: Her admission and the NIK test, Your 
13 Honor. 
14 MR. RETALLICK: Your Honor, her admission was that 
15 this was -- belonged to a friend. The officer stated that he 
16 told her it was cocaine and she said this is something that 
17 belonged to a friend. There's no -- the simple fact if 
18 somebody possesses something that they may think may be a 
19 controlled substance is insufficient to bind over, Your 
2 0 Honor. 
21 MR. BUNDERSON: I don't think that's what she said. 
22 THE COURT: The criteria is reasonable grounds. The 
23 note I had made, and it fs possible I didn't make a correct 
24 note, but the note I made indicated that she said it was 
25 cocaine which belonged to a friend. • 
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1 MR. RETALLICK: Your Honor, the officer's report, 
2 and I can quote that for you, indicates "I asked her if the 
3 purse in the van was hers. She stated that it was. I then 
4 asked her about the cocaine. She sort of smiled and stated 
5 it belonged to a friend of hers. She claimed she does not 
6 indulge in drugs. I asked her if she'd been drinking prior 
7 to the accident and she implied no." 
8 That does not indicate knowledge. The officer is saying 
9 what is this. This is cocaine. Where did you get it. She 
10 says that was given to me by a friend. It does not indicate 
11 that sufficient knowledge -- even if she believed it was 
12 cocaine and it turned out not to be cocaine, they couldn't go 
13 forward on the charge, Your Honor. 
14 MR. BUNDERSON: His testimony is what counts, Your 
15 Honor, not what's in his report. My recollection is that she 
16 told him it was cocaine. And when questioned on 
17 cross-examination, again, if I recall correctly, he clarified 
18 that and said that he assumed she meant it was cocaine. In 
19 addition, of course, we have the NIK test. 
20 MR. RETALLICK: But there is no evidence of the NIK 
21 test, Your Honor. 
22 MR. BUNDERSON: Hearsay in a preliminary hearing is 
23 admissible. 
24 MR. RETALLICK: But he didn't say whether it was 
25 positive or negative and didn't say whether he witnessed it. 
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1 THE COURT: He didn't say he witnessed it, but he 
2 said that there was a flash test that was positive. 
3 1 The court finds that there are reasonable grounds to 
4 1 believe that the defendant committed the offense. Reasonable 
5 grounds is certainly a lower standard than applies at trial, 
6 1 as counsel is well aware. The court will require that the 
• 7 defendant be held to answer on the charges, 
8 Does she want to go ahead and conduct the arraignment 
9 right now? 
10 MR. RBTALLICK: Yes, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. She's previously received a copy 
12 of the information. Does the defendant waive the formal 
13 reading of those charges? 
14 MR. RETALLICK: Yes, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: As to the charges in counts one and two, 
16 how does the defendant plead? 
17 MR. RETALLICK: Not guilty, Your Honor. We'll be 
18 filing a motion to suppress in this case. 
19 THE COURT: How much time do you need to get your 
2 0 motion filed? 
21 MR. RETALLICK: Probably two weeks, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. June 12th. How much time would 
23 the state need to respond after that? 
24 MR. BUNDERSON: A couple of weeks, please. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. June 12th and then June 26th. Do 
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we have time to put this on for a hearing on the 8th or 9th 
any time? 
(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. RETALLICK: My client is out of town on 
business, Your Honor, on the 8th and 9th. 
THE COURT: Let's go two weeks later. How about the 
22nd, which is a Monday, at 2:30? Does that work? We'll set 
the hearing for July 22nd at 2:30. If counsel need more time 
on their memoranda, I can go back and change those deadlines. 
MR. RETALLICK: I may get mine done sooner than 
this. I've done quite a bit of research on this. 
MR. BUNDERSON: When was the suppression hearing, 
Your Honor? 
THE COURT: July 22nd at 2:30. We'll leave the same 
deadlines for the written memoranda. 
MR. BUNDERSON: If counsel needs more time, that's 
fine, just as long as we have a couple of weeks also. 
THE COURT: Okay. The 22nd of July, 2:30 in the 
afternoon. 
MR. RETALLICK: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
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That a full, true and correct transcription of the 
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the 
pages numbered 2 to 16, inclusive. 
I further certify that the original transcript was 
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Box Elder 
County, Brigham City, Utah. 
I also certify that I am not associated with any 
of the parties to said matter and that I am not interested 
in the event thereof. 
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1 . THE CLERK; Case number 0211-39, State of Utah 
2 versus Tanja Rynhart. 
3 THE COURT: This is the time scheduled for a hearing 
4 on the defendant's motion to suppress. I've reviewed briefly 
5 the motion as well as the response. This is the evidentiary 
6 hearing. Are counsel ready to proceed? 
7 MR. RETALLICK: Yes, Your Honor. 
8 MR. BUNDERSON: We are. 
9 THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Bunderson. 
10 MR. BUNDERSON: Your Honor, I'm prepared to call 
11 Officer Burnham to the stand. He testified at some length in 
12 the preliminary hearing. If it would be useful for the 
13 court, he's here and we can refresh the court's recollection 
14 of what he has to say today. 
15 THE COURT: I recall, just in general, the facts 
16 from the preliminary hearihg after reviewing the memoranda, 
17 but you maybe better address the things you think are 
18 relevant to the search. ., 
19 MR. RETALLICK: I wonder if we can do that by 
20 proffer? 
21 MR. BUNDERSON: We may be able to. Let me try this. 
22 Someone called in, and it was not the landowner of the 
23 property. Someone called in and said there's a car off the 
24 road. This was on West Forest Street, if I recall right, at 
25 a curve. There's an S curve there at the intersection of 
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1 1200 West and Watery Lane. The vehicle was off in a field 
2 there, having obviously failed to negotiate the curve. 
3 THE COURT: Had it gone through a fence? 
4 MR. BUNDERSON: It went through two fences and 
5 destroyed them. Because of the timing of the snow fall, the 
6 officer was able to determine that the accident happened 
7 I about 3:00 a.m. He got there about 8:30. That's when 
8 someone first called it in. The owner of the property wanted 
9 the vehicle removed. It was ultimately towed away. 
10 Officer Burnham approached the vehicle, found no one in 
11 the vicinity. He looked into the vehicle to see what was in 
12 it. He testified that he was looking for who was there, 
13 maybe someone was in the vehicle injured. Maybe some 
14 evidence of who was driving it. He found a purse there and 
15 opened it and that's where the drugs were found. 
16 He didnft do a formal inventory, but he did retrieve 
17 property from the vehicle and took it into evidence before 
18 the vehicle was towed away. And it was towed away later that 
19 morning, if I recall right. He made attempts to contact Ms. 
20 Rynhart and finally did locate her and she made some 
21 admissions after he located her. 
22 We think this is basically an abandoned property issue or 
23 perhaps an exigent circumstances issue. We don't have a 
24 brief filed yet. Their's was a bit late and we thought we'd 
25 just wait until we had this hearing before we did that. 
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1 That's basically what we think would be added to the facts 
2 that they have already given the court. I don't know if 
3 there's any problem with what' I've said. 
4 MR. RETALLICK: The only exception I take to that is 
5 in the officer's report it says since the owner of the 
6 vehicle could not be located I had Brett's Towing remove the 
7 vehicle from the marsh. There's no indication that there was 
8 a specific request by the property owner. But even if that 
9 were the case, Your Honor, 41-6-116.10 refers to abandoned 
.10 I vehicles in the state of Utah. It defines an abandoned 
11 vehicle as any vehicle left unattended on a highway for a 
12 period in excess of 48 hours, or on any public or private 
13 property for a period in excess of seven days without express 
14 or implied consent of the owner, or person in lawful 
15 possession or control of the property. 
16 So technically, under the statutes and the laws of the 
17 state of Utah, this vehicle could not be considered abandoned 
18 since it was not on private property in excess of seven days. 
19 So it has to be longer -- it has to be there more than seven 
20 days. 
21 It's very similar to the situation, Your Honor, where if 
22 somebody parks in our parking lot behind our building and 
23 leave their vehicle there for a couple of days, if we want 
24 the vehicle towed we take the responsibility. We can't call 
25 the police officer and have them come over and have them tow 
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1 the vehicle. We take responsibility by retaining a towing 
2 company to tow it. And the ultimate decision as to who ends 
3 up paying for that depends on the situation of the vehicle. 
4 But we would have to be responsible for that, just the same 
5 way as this property owner would have to be. 
6 THE COURT: Let me ask you, that appears to be 
7 consistent with the statute you're reciting, but I'm having a 
8 little trouble reconciling that. Let's say this occurs in 
9 the city instead of out on West Forest. The vehicle jumps 
10 the curb, tears up the front lawn and smacks into the house. 
11 MR. RETALLICK: Well, Your Honor — 
12 THE COURT: Does the property owner have to assume 
13 the responsibility for that towing under those circumstances? 
14 MR. RETALLICK: I believe so, Your Honor, according 
15 to the statute. Well, if you're going under an abandoned 
16 vehicle theory. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. I see. All right. 
18 MR. RETALLICK: But even, Your Honor, let's assume 
19 that the officer -- I'm going to cut the officer some slack 
20 here. To the point where he actually goes and looks inside 
21 the vehicle, I think as part of his care taking functions he 
22 does have the obligation to check the vehicle. I used to do 
23 that when I was a deputy. You see a vehicle off the road in 
24 the snow and everything and we would go and check the vehicle 
25 to make sure there's no one injured inside the vehicle. Then 
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1 we would mark the vehicle so that other officers would knew 
2 it has been checked. 
3 He does have the responsibility to look inside and make 
4 sure there's no one in there. But he exceeded his authority 
5 by going forward and searching personal property within a 
6 vehicle, which still does have the reasonable expectation of 
7 I privacy, although to a lesser extent than a home. But there 
8 1 is still the constitutional protections there, Your Honor. 
9 In order to determine who owned the vehicle he simply could 
10 have run the license plates. He didn't have to rummage 
111 through personal belongings, especially someone's purse. 
12 If he was concerned about the property being unsecured, 
13 1 you lock the doors and leave the vehicle. There were a lot 
14 of other less intrusive methods to do what he was trying to 
15 accomplish. 
16 As far as doing an impound, the officer admitted during 
17 his preliminary hearing testimony that this was not an 
18 impound. He was not impounding. Quite frankly, I was glad 
19 that he admitted that. I had previously gotten from the 
20 1 Brigham City police department copies of their impound forms, 
21 the documents that he would have had to do and the procedures 
22 he would have had to follow if they were trying to claim this 
23 I under the impound. I didn't even go into that because he 
24 admitted on the stand that this was not an impound. 
25 As good as his intentions were, I think he exceeded the 
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1 scope of his authority in this case. 
2 MR. BUNDERSON: And we think not. We think that 
3 under this circumstance merely checking on the license plate 
4 wouldn't tell you who was driving the car necessarily. And 
5 secondly, I believe he did testify that he used that method 
6 and did try and find someone and couldn't find anyone to 
7 begin with. Maybe I'm wrong about that. 
8 Checking the license plate and seeing if the owner could 
9 be contacted? Okay. That was tried. The private property 
10 owner wanted the vehicle removed. There was damage to the 
11 property. Those fences had to be rebuilt. 
12 THE COURT: I don't know if that came in anywhere. 
13 MR. BUNDERSON: That part didn't, but certainly that 
14 can be assumed. 
15 MR. RETALLICK: No, I don't think it can be assumed, 
16 Your Honor. It's not in the officer's report. 
17 MR. BUNDERSON: If you want testimony that the 
18 property owner wanted it removed, we can certainly add that. 
19 THE COURT: Well, maybe you better have it if you 
20 claim that's a fact, because I don't think there was anything 
21 about that at the prelim. 
22 MR. RETALLICK: And we would object based on it 
23 being hearsay, Your Honor. We don't have the information. 
2.4 I The property owner isn't here. It's not in the police 
25 report. Typically, if a property owner requests it be 
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removed, it would be in there. And I don't believe thac's ar. 
issue anyway, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Does the officer claim the property 
owner contacted him? 
MR. BUNDERSON: You called the property owner and 
what did he say? 
OFFICER BURNHAM: He wanted the vehicle out. 
MR. BUNDERSON: It's that simple. He called the 
property owner and the property owner said I want the vehicle 
out. 
THE COURT: I don't know whether that's going to be 
determinative or not, but maybe we better get a record on it 
so we don't get hung up later on those issues. 
MR. RETALLICK: I'd stipulate to that, Your Honor. 
I have no reason to doubt that the officer contacted the 
property owner and the owner said he wanted it removed. 
THE COURT: Let's tie down the time sequence. When 
was that in relation to everything else? 
OFFICER BURNHAM: Ten minutes after I left I called 
him. 
THE COURT: Ten minutes after what? 
MR. BUNDERSON: About 8:45, approximately. Ten 
minutes after the officer arrived. 
THE COURT: So before the vehicle was towed and 
25 before the search of the purse? 
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1 MR. BUNDERSON: It was before the vehicle was towed 
2 obviously. 
3 MR. RETALLICK: Was it before the search? Do you 
4 recall that, officer? 
5 MR. BUNDERSON: He's looking at his notes. 
6 (Pause in the proceedings.) 
7 OFFICER BURNHAM: The property owner arrived and I 
8 had the purse in my hand when he drove up. 
9 MR. BUNDERSON: So you called him? 
10 MR. RETALLICK: I'm sorry, what was that? 
11 MR. BUNDERSON: I'm lost. Let me see if I've got it 
12 1 right. You called the property owner about ten minutes after 
13 I you arrived? 
14 OFFICER BURNHAM: Yes. 
15 MR. RETALLICK: Your Honor, maybe we ought to put 
16 the officer on the stand concerning this. 
17 THE COURT: Yes. Let's do that and then we'll have 
18 1 it done the first time. 
19 ROBERT BURNHAM, 
20 being first duly sworn, was examined and . 
21 testified as follows: 
22 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
23 BY MR. BUNDERSON: 
24 Q. This is just some supplemental testimony to your 
25 preliminary hearing testimony and your police report. As I 
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1 understand it, you arrived approximately at 8:30 and found 
2 this vehicle in the field, is that correct? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And at some point, approximately ten minutes after that, 
5 you called the property owner, do I understand that 
6 correctly? 
7 A . I had dispatch contact the property owner, yes. 
8 Q. Did you actually talk to the property owner over either a 
9 radio or telephone? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. Did you have some contact with the property owner? And 
12 if so when and how? 
13 J A. He arrived on the scene just within a few minutes. He 
14 doesn't live very far away. He arrived and we had a 
15 conversation at that point. 
16 Q. And he said what? 
17 A. He said that he wanted the vehicle to be removed. 
18 Q. Now, at some point you had picked up the purse out of the 
19 I car, is that correct? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. And the car was unlocked? You didn't have to break into 
22 it in any way? 
23 A. That's correct. 
24 Q. You recall holding the purse in your hand while talking 
25 to the property owner? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 11 
1 A. It was in my hand or on the trunk of my car. I had 
2 recovered it at that time. 
3 Q. Do you recall if you had opened it at that time? 
•4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. So you had found the drugs before the property owner got 
6 there? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 MR. BUNDERSON: Thank you. 
9 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
10 BY MR. RETALLICK: 
11 Q. Officer, the property owner is the sheriff, isn't that 
12 correct? 
13 A. Yes, it is. 
14 Q. And you would assume the sheriff would have personal 
15 knowledge of the statute that I cited concerning abandoned 
16 property? 
17 MR. BUNDERSON: Well, I'll object. 
18 MR. RETALLICK: I'll strike it. 
19 Q. (BY MR. RETALLICK) Now, did you do a complete inventory 
20 of all items in the vehicle? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. All right. So basically .-- let's think of this in a 
23 liability situation. Let's suppose someone came to you and 
24 said, officer, there was $10,000 worth of jewelry in this 
25 vehicle and it's now missing. Who is. going to be responsible 
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1 or who would you anticipate being liable in that situation 
2 because -- did you do any kind of inventory to ensure or 
3 J protect against your liability? 
4 A. You're calling it an inventory. I did look through the 
5 entire vehicle for any valuables. The only thing I found was 
6 what was contained in the purse: Some cash and the other 
7 items mentioned. 
8 Q. But you didn't put it down --
9 A. I didn't write anything down. 
10 Q. ' Okay. 
11 A. I did look through the vehicle. I opened all the doors. 
12 1 I looked under the seats. There was quite a number of items 
13 1 in the vehicle. I was primarily concerned with, as you 
14 mentioned, jewelry or money. 
15 Q. Okay. So you did a very thorough search of this vehicle, 
16 looking under the seats and so on? 
17 A. (Witness nodded his head.) 
18 Q. You were looking for contraband? 
19 A. If I'd have found it I would have taken it, yes. 
20 THE COURT: One question I have. Remind me of what 
21 type of vehicle this was? 
2 2 THE WITNESS: A mini van. 
23 THE COURT:, Any other questions? 
24 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 5 BY MR. BUNDERSON: 
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1 Q. You did see several items when you were looking through 
2 the vehicle? 
3 A. Yes, I did. 
4 Q. You made a record of those? 
5 A. Yes, I did. 
6 Q. You passed over and left in the vehicle items that didn't 
7 appear to have any particular value, as I understand it? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And retrieved items that obviously had value, such as the 
10 purse, cash in the purse? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Was there a briefcase you also took? 
13 A. There was a briefcase, but I don't remember -- Ifd have 
14 to look at my notes. I don't remember if I took it or not. 
15 It was listed in my report, but I don't remember if I took 
16 it. 
17 Q. All right. Do you recall approximately what time the 
18 vehicle was towed, do you have that in your records? 
19 A. I have a note here in my radio log at 9:35 something to 
20 do with the wrecker, but I don't know if that's when --
21 that's just a note that dispatch put in. I think they were 
22 I being summoned to another call. 
23 Q. Would it be consistent with your recollection that the 
24 towing occurred at about that time, 9:35? 
25 A. I was on the scene until 10:00. The vehicle was towed 
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1 prior to me leaving the scene. 
2 Q. Okay. 
3 A. In fact, it would have been just a few minutes -- there 
4 would have been no reason for me to stay after the vehicle 
5 was removed. 
6 Q. Okay. This is something that you may not have a note on, 
7 Do you recall if there were any livestock, animals, in the 
8 field? 
9 A. There is some times. They keep cattle in there, but I 
10 believe they winter them somewhere else. 
11 MR. BUNDERSON: That's all I have. 
12 THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Retallick? 
13 MR. RETALLICK: Yes. 
14 RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
15 BY MR. RETALLICK: 
16 Q. Does your department have a policy concerning mandatory 
17 impound? 
18 A. Not that I'm aware of, unless it's a DUI. 
19 Q. There's no mandatory impound if you find controlled 
20 substances in a vehicle? 
21 A. No, I don't believe so. 
22 MR. RETALLICK: Okay. Nothing further, Your Honor. 
23 MR. BUNDERSON: I haven't anything further. 
24 THE COURT: You may step down. Mr. Bunderson, how 
25 much time do you need to get your response in? 
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1.1 MR. BUNDERSON: A couple of weeks, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Any objection to that, Mr. Retallick? 
3 MR. RETALLICK: No, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: All right. I'll give the state until 
5 August 5th at five to have their reply in. 
6 MR. RETALLICK: Your Honor, I should be able to 
7 J review their reply and let the court know whether there is 
any rebuttal necessary. 
9 1 THE COURT: Let me ask you to do this. If you'll 
10 review the reply and either submit a rebuttal or just file a 
111 little paper that says notice to submit. One or the other, 
12 so that the matter gets reviewed, 
13 MR. RETALLICK: Thank you, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Anything else? 
15 MR. BUNDERSON: No. 
16 THE COURT: We'll take a short recess and then take 
17 the last case, 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the videotaped hearing was 
transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court 
Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for 
the State of Utah, residing at Brigham City, Utah. 
That a full, true and correct transcription of the 
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the 
pages numbered 2 to 15, inclusive. 
I further certify that the original transcript was 
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Box Elder 
County, Brigham City, Utah. 
I also certify that I am not associated with any 
of the parties to said matter and that I am not interested 
in the event thereof. 
Witness my hand this 26th day of November, 2002. 
\ * 
r • r 
Rodney M. Felshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
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Addendum C 
Addendum C. 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 




11680 North Rocky Point Rd. 




Case No. 021100039 FS 
HON. BEN H. HADFIELD 
This matter comes before the court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant 
seeks to suppress evidence found in her purse when an officer searched it on finding it in her 
vehicle. On 6 January 2002 a property owner who happens to be the Box Elder County Sheriff 
called officer Burnham about a vehicle that had jumped the curb, crashed through two fences 
and came to rest offthe road in a marsh. Upon investigating, Officer Burnham discovered that 
the vehicle had been there at least five or six hours and that the driver was not anywhere near 
the vehicle. Officer Burnham searched the vehicle and the purse in an effort to determine who 
the driver was. 
The Defendant frames the issue as whether the officer conducted a proper search 
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incident to "impounding" the vehicle. The State has couched the issues as whether the vehicle 
was "abandoned" or whether, if not, the officer's search was valid because he was functioning 
in his "community caretaker" role. 
The court agrees with the Defendant that the officer did not properly impound the 
vehicle so that he could not use that as a basis to justify the search. He completed no inventory. 
He apparently did not officially impound the vehicle. The State, however, does not rely on the 
impoundment to justify the search. 
The court does not believe that a warrant is required to search an abandoned vehicle 
as the expectation of privacy in such a vehicle is greatly lessened. Nor does the court believe 
that the presumption of abandonment set forth in Utah Code Ann §41-6-116.10 is coextensive 
with the concept of "abandonment" for purposes of the fourth amendment analysis. Rather, 
abandonment for determining the expectation of privacy must be determined from the facts of 
the specific case which may involve the section 116.10(4) criteria or additional factors such as 
leaving the vehicle at the scene of an accident as was done here. See State v. Anderson, 1996 
S.D. 59, 548 N.W.2d 40 (1996). The Utah Court of Appeals has summarized the applicable 
law in another context: 
Whether defendant had abandoned her purse, under search and seizure 
analysis, is primarily a factual question of intent to voluntarily 
relinquish a reasonable expectation of privacy, which may be inferred 
from "words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts." Thomas, 
864 F.2d at 846 (quoting United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 
(5th Cir. 1973)). See also Gurgel v. Nichol, 19 Utah 2d 200, 429 P.2d 
47,48 (1967) (abandonment ordinarily a question for the factfinder to 
2 
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be determined from the facts and circumstances). The burden of 
proving abandonment falls on the state, People v. Contreras, 210 Cal. 
App. 3d 450,259 Cal. Rptr. 290,293 (1989), and must be shown by 
"clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence." Friedman v. United States, 
347 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 1965). See also United States v. Boswell, 
347 A.2d 270, 274 (D.C. 1975); O'Shaughnessy v. State, 420 So. 2d 
377, 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). It "is measured from the vantage 
point" of the defendant, [** 19] and not the police. Narain v. State, 79 
Md. App. 385, 556 A.2d 1158, 1161 n.4 (1989). "It is only the 
[defendant's] state of mind that counts." Id. 
State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, (Utah Ct. App. 1991) rev 'd on other grounds State v. Rowe, 850 
P.2d 427 (Utah 1992). Applying the standards set forth in Rowe, the court must conclude that 
the State has failed to carry its burden to show abandonment. The officer inspected the vehicle 
at 8:30 in the morning and determined that it had been in the marsh since at least 3:00 a.m. that 
morning. The owner or driver would not have had time to make arrangements to retrieve the 
vehicle if it was damaged. The State failed to present any evidence of the state of the vehicle. 
If the vehicle could be driven, then the officer may have been more justified in believing that 
it had been abandoned. Although there clearly had been an accident, it appears that no other 
vehicles were involved. The apparent early hour, the winter conditions, and the single vehicle 
nature of the accident all combine to belie the officer's imputing an intent to abandon the 
vehicle. 
The court does find, however, that the community caretaker function of the officer 
was properly invoked here. The accident occurred around 3:00 a.m. on a cold January night. 
The absence of the driver made it imperative that the officer identify the driver so that he or she 
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I 
could be found. The driver could have been in distress and lost or disoriented. The officer 
acted appropriately in attempting to determine who was the driver. Although the Defendant 
makes a good point that the owner of the vehicle could be ascertained by using the license plate 
number, the owner and the driver are not necessarily the same person, and the officer had a duty 
to ascertain the facts in order to preserve life in the event the driver had wandered off and was 
lost. As such, all three prongs of the Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12 994 P.2d 
1283 (2000) test are satisfied. (1) The officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that 
an emergency existed - a vehicle involved in an accident in the early morning hours that had 
been left by its driver. (2) The officer testified that the search was for the purpose of 
ascertaining who was the driver so that the motivation was not primarily to arrest or seize 
evidence, and (3) it was reasonable to search the purse in connection with the emergency. 
The motion to suppress is denied. Counsel for the State shall prepare an order in 
conformance with this decision. 
Dated this O I day of b \ » 2 0 ^ - i 
By the court 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 021100039 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail JON J. BUNDERSON 
ATTORNEY PLA 
45 NORTH 1ST EAST 
45 NORTH FIRST EAST 
BRIGHAM CITY, UT 84302 
Mail JAMES M RETALLICK 
ATTORNEY DEF 
2562 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDEN UT 84401 
Dated this _£3. daY of U"0 20/2^. 
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